Legal Analysis of the NSA Domestic Surveillance Program:
by Orin Kerr, Professor at George Washington University Law School
Was the secret NSA surveillance program legal? Was it constitutional? Did it
violate federal statutory law? It turns out these are hard questions, but I
wanted to try my best to answer them. My answer is pretty tentative, but
here it goes: Although it hinges somewhat on technical details we don't
know, it seems that the program was probably constitutional but probably
violated the federal law known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
My answer is extra-cautious for two reasons. First, there is some wiggle
room in FISA, depending on technical details we don't know of how the
surveillance was done. Second, there is at least a colorable argument — if,
I think in the end, an unpersuasive one — that the surveillance was
authorized by the Authorization to Use Miltary Force as construed in the
Hamdi opinion.
This is a really long post, so let me tell you where I'm going. I'm going to
start with the Fourth Amendment; then turn to FISA; next look to the
Authorization to Use Military Force; and conclude by looking at claim that
the surveillance was justified by the inherent authority of Article II. And
before I start, let me be clear that nothing in this post is intended to
express or reflect a normative take of whether the surveillance program is a
good idea or a bad idea. In other words, I'm just trying to answer what the
law is, not say what the law should be.
The Fourth Amendment. On the whole, I think there are some pretty decent
arguments that this program did not violate the Fourth Amendment under
existing precedent. There are a bunch of different arguments here, but let
me focus on two: the border search exception and a national security
exception. Neither is a slam dunk, by any means, but each are plausible
arguments left open by the cases.
The border search exception permits searches at the border of the United
States "or its functional equivalent." United States v. Montoya De
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). The idea here is that the United States
as a sovereign has a right to inspect stuff entering or exiting the country
as a way of protecting its sovereign interests, and that the Fourth
Amendment permits such searches. Courts have applied the border search
exception in cases of PCs and computer hard drives; if you bring a computer
into or out of the United States, the government can search your computer
for contraband or other prohibited items at the airport or wherever you are
entering or leaving the country. See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d
501 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J.).
As I understand it, all of the monitoring involved in the NSA program
involved international calls (and international e-mails). That is, the NSA
was intercepting communications in the U.S., but only communications going
outside the U.S. or coming from abroad. I'm not aware of any cases applying
the border search exception to raw data, as compared to the search of a
physical device that stores data, so this is untested ground. At the same
time, I don't know of a rationale in the caselaw for treating data
differently than physical storage devices. The case law on the border search
exception is phrased in pretty broad language, so it seems at least
plausible that a border search exception could apply to monitoring at an ISP
or telephone provider as the "functional equivalent of the border," much
like airports are the functional equivalent of the border in the case of
international airline travel.
or left comments expressing skepticism about this argument. In response, let
me point out the most persuasive case on point: United States v. Ramsey,
holding that the border search exception applies to all international postal
mail, permitting all international postal mail to be searched. Again, this
isn't a slam dunk, but I think a plausible argument -- and with dicta that
seems to say that mode of transportation is not relevant.]
The government would have a second argument in case a court doesn't accept
the border search exception: the open question of whether there is a
national security exception to the Fourth Amendment that permits the
government to conduct searches and surveillance for foreign intelligence
surveillance. Footnote 23 of Katz v. United States left this open, and
Justice White's conccurrence in Katz expanded on this point:
Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by
successive Presidents. The present Administration would apparently save
national security cases from restrictions against wiretapping. We should not
require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President
of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has
considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic
surveillance as reasonable.
The Supreme Court also left this question open in the so-called "Keith"
case, United States v. United States District Court, in 1972. Justice
Powell's opinion in the Keith case concluded that there was no national
security exception to the Fourth Amendment for evidence collection involving
domestic organizations, but expressly held open the possibility that such an
exception existed for foreign intelligence collection:
Further, the instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the
President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign
powers, within or without this country. The Attorney General's affidavit in
this case states that the surveillances were "deemed necessary to protect
the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the
existing structure of Government." There is no evidence of any involvement,
directly or indirectly, of a foreign power.
The administration presumably takes the position that the President does
have such power in cases involving foreign evidence collection, and that the
NSA surveillance is such a case. The Supreme Court has never resolved the
question, so it's an open constitutional issue. Nonetheless, between the
border search exception and the open possibility of a national security
exception, there are pretty decent arguments that the monitoring did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Maybe persuasive, maybe not, but certainly
open and fair arguments under the case law.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Now let's turn to FISA, a 1978 law
that Congress enacted in response to the Keith case. FISA goes beyond the
Keith case, including foreign intelligence surveillance in its scope even
though it was left open as a constututional question.
Specifically, 50 U.S.C. 1809 prohibits "electronic surveillance" except as
authorized by statutory law: "A person is guilty of an offense if he
intentionally . . . engages in electronic surveillance under color of law
except as authorized by statute." "Electronic surveillance" is defined in 50
U.S.C. 1801(f) to mean, in relevant part:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or
intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is
in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally
targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the
United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition
occurs in the United States. . . .
A "United States person" is defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(i) as "a citizen of
the United States
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."
A "wire communication" is defined as a communication that is traveling by a
wire; I don't know if "radio communication" is a defined term, but I assume
it refers primary to satellite communications.
Putting aside the AUMF and statutory exceptions for now, let's consider
whether the NSA surveillance program violates the basic prohibition of 50
U.S.C. 1809 — intentionally conducting electronic surveillance. I think the
answer is probably yes. If the surveillance tapped wire communications under
1801(f)(2), the case is pretty clear: the surveillance involved people in
the U.S. and survillance in the U.S., and that's all that is required. If
the surveillance involved radio communications (satellite communications,
I'm guessing), that's a bit trickier. There is at least a little wiggle room
in Section 1801(f)(1). For example, you could say that the border search
exception eliminates Fourth Amendment protection, such that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore there would be no warrant
required in an analogous criminal case. In that case, the tapping of the
radio communication wouldn't count as "electronic surveillance." I don't
think we know the details of how the communucations were obtained, so I
think it's fair to say that the surveillance probably violated the basic
proibition but it at least arguably depends on some of the technical details
we don't know.
Now, on to the exceptions. 50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General,
may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this
subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to
one year if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that--
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at--
(i) the acquisition of the contents of communications transmitted by means
of communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers, as
defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3) of this title; or
(ii) the acquisition of technical intelligence, other than the spoken
communications of individuals, from property or premises under the open and
exclusive control of a foreign power, as defined in section 1801(a)(1), (2),
or (3) of this title;
(B) there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire
the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a
party.
Does this exception permit the monitoring? Note that (i) and (ii) are both
dealing with "foreign power, as defined in (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this
title." FISA's definition of "foreign power" appears in 50 U.S.C. 1801:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized
by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or
governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or
governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
So as I read the statutes, Congress was trying to give an exception for
monitoring foreign governments (a1, a2, a3) but not terrorist groups (a4,
a5, a6), so long as no citizens or lawful permanent resident aliens were
being monitored. There are interesting questions of how that might have
applied to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but I don't think we need to reach them.
It's my understanding that the program monitored both citizens and
non-citizens, so I don't see how the exception is applicable.
(Aside: Remember back in 2003 when a copy of the Administration's "Domestic
Security Enhancement Act" — sometimes dubbed "Patriot II" — was leaked to
the press? Section 501 of that Act would have made "providing material
support" to a terrorist group an automatic ground for terminating
citizenship. This is just a guess, but I wonder if the thinking was that
this would make the NSA warrantless monitoring program legal under FISA. An
individual who made regular contact with Al Qaeda could be giving them
material support, and the individual would then no longer be a United States
person and could then be legally subject to monitoring. Just speculation,
but it might explain the thinking behind the legislative proposal. Anyway,
back to our regularly scheduled programming.)
Authorization to Use Military Force. The next question is whether the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224,
justified the monitoring. The authorizaton states in relevant part:
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) IN GENERAL.--That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
I assume that the Administration's claim is that the AUMF counts as a
"statute" that authorizes the surveillance: 50 U.S.C. 1809 states that "A
person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally . . . engages in
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute,"
so if the AUMF authorized the electronic surveillance, then the NSA program
didn't violate FISA.
The Supreme Court considered the legal effect of the AUMF in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld. Yaser Hamdi was being held as an enemy combatant, and claimed that
his detention violated 18 U.S.C. 4001. Section 4001(a) states that "o
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States
except pursuant to an Act of Congress." Given Justice Thomas's very broad
reading of the AUMF in his dissent, I think the key interpretation is that
of Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. Justice O'Connor concluded that the the
AUMF was "an act of Congress" that authorized Hamdi's detention, such that
the detention did not violate 4001(a):
The AUMF authorizes the President to use "all necessary and appropriate
force" against "nations, organizations, or persons" associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 224. There can be no doubt
that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part
of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda
terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress
sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of
individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the
duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so
fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
"necessary and appropriate force" Congress has authorized the President to
use.
The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention,
and trial of unlawful combatants, by "universal agreement and practice," are
"important incident's of war." Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., at 28. The
purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to
the field of battle and taking up arms once again. . . .
In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use
specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant's
return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in
permitting the use of "necessary and appropriate force," Congress has
clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances
considered here.
Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite or perpetual
detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of
interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress' grant of
authority for the use of "necessary and appropriate force" to include the
authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.
. . .
The United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities,
individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who "engaged in
an armed conflict against the United States." If the record establishes that
United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan,
those detentions are part of the exercise of "necessary and appropriate
force," and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.
So does the AUMF authorize the surveillance? As often happens when you're
trying to draw guidance from an O'Connor opinion, it's not entirely clear.
Under her opinion, the key question is whether the act is "so fundamental
and accepted an incident to war" that it falls within the authorization. But
that depends on the level of generality you chose to use to define "the
act." Is "the act" spying on the enemy? In that case, perhaps it is a
fundamental incident to war. Or is "the act" conducting U.S. domestic
surveillance of U.S. citizens? In that case, the answer is no, it's not a
fundamental incident to war.
In the end, my best sense is that the AUMF doesn't extend to this. I have
three reasons. First, O'Connor's opinion says the following about detention
for interrogation: "Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the
purpose of interrogation is not authorized." It seems to me that
surveillance and wiretapping is pretty similar to interrogation: the point
of both is getting information about your enemy. Second, it doesn't seem
like wiretapping counts as a "use of force." If you read the text of the
AUMF, it doesn't seem to me that it authorizes wiretapping. Finally, note
that Congress passed the Patriot Act about a month after passing the AUMF;
if Congress had intended the AUMF to give the president wide authority to
conduct domestic surveillance against Al Qaeda, I don't think they would
have spent so much time amending FISA for terrorism investigations. So at
bottom, I think the AUMF probably didn't authorize this, although the Hamdi
case gives some colorable (if ultimately unpersuasive) arguments that it
might.
Article II. The final argument is that Article II of the Constitution gives
the President inherent authority to conduct such monitoring. The
Administration introduced this theory in a supplemental brief filed in the
FISA Court of Review:
The President Has Inherent Authoritv to Conduct Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance to Protect National Security from Foreign Threats.
In considering the constitutionality of the amended FISA, it is important to
understand that FISA is not required by the Constitution. Rather, the
Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct
warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise) of foreign
powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute extinguish that
constitutional authority. Both before and after the enactment of FISA,
courts have recognized the President's inherent authority to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance. See, e.g., Butenko, 494 F.2d at 608 (grounding
exception to warrant requirement in the President's Commander-in-chief and
foreign-affairs powers; noting that the country's self-defense needs weigh
on the side of reasonableness); Truong, 629 F.2d at 914 (citing the
President's foreign affairs power as justifying an exception to the warrant
requirement); cf. United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407
U.S. 297, 308 (1972)(reserving the question whether the President's
foreign-affairs powers justify exception from warrant requirement).
So the argument, as I understand it, is that Congress has no power to
legislate in a way that inteferes with the President's Commander-in-Chief
power, a judgment made, I suppose, by the President himself.
I have been unable to find any caselaw in support of this argument. Further,
the argument has no support from the cases cited in the government's brief.
In all three of those cases — Butenko, Truong, and Keith - the Courts were
talking about whether the President's interest in conducting foreign
intelligence monitoring creates an exception to the Warrant Requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. In other words, the issue in those case was whether
the Constitution bars warrantless surveillance absent Congressional action,
not whether Congressional prohibitons in this area cannot bind the Executive
branch.
Consider the citation to the Butenko case. Here is the relevant section,
from 494 F.2d at 608:
Both executive authority in the foreign affairs area and society's interest
in privacy are of significance, and are equally worthy of judicial concern.
. . .
The importance of the President's responsibilities in the foreign affairs
field requires the judicial branch to act with the utmost care when asked to
place limitations on the President's powers in that area. As
Commander-in-Chief, the President must guard the country from foreign
aggression, sabotage, and espionage. Obligated to conduct this nation's
foreign affairs, he must be aware of the posture of foreign nations toward
the United States, the intelligence activities of foreign countries aimed at
uncovering American secrets, and the policy positions of foreign states on a
broad range of international issues.
To be sure, in the course of such wiretapping conversations of alien
officials and agents, and perhaps of American citizens, will be overheard
and to that extent, their privacy infringed. But the Fourth Amendment
proscribes only 'unreasonable' searches and seizures. And balanced against
this country's self-defense needs, we cannot say that the district court
erred in concluding that the electronic surveillance here did not trench
upon Ivanov's Fourth Amendment rights.
As I read this analysis, it is entirely focused on the Fourth Amendment, and
specifically whether the President's Commander in Chief power should trigger
a relaxed Fourth Amendment standard. That seems quite different from a claim
that Article II makes Congressional regulation inoperative. The same goes
for the citation to Truong, 629 F.2d at 914. In the course of discussing
whether the Courts should require a warant for foreig intelligence
surveillance, the court tried to balance the ability of courts to regulate
intelligence surveillance with the strong governmentg interest:
Perhaps most crucially, the executive branch not only has superior expertise
in the area of foreign intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated
as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs. The President and his
deputies are charged by the constitution with the conduct of the foreign
policy of the United States in times of war and peace. Just as the
separation of powers in Keith forced the executive to recognize a judicial
role when the President conducts domestic security surveillance, so the
separation of powers requires us to acknowledge the principal responsibility
of the President for foreign affairs and concomitantly for foreign
intelligence surveillance.
In sum, because of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its
practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should
not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign
intelligence surveillance.
While the Court was recognizing the President's constitutional role, it was
in a very specific context: balancing reasonableness in the context of
Fourth Amendment law to determine whether the surveillance required a
warrant. Again, this doesn't seem to go to whether Congress can impose
binding statutory prohibitions beyond the Fourth Amendment.
UPDATE: additional thoughts:
Of course you’re right that Keith and Katz reserved the question whether the
President may engage in warrantless surveillance of foreign-based threats to
the national security. While the Supreme Court has never addressed the
issue, a number of federal appellate courts, some of which you cite at the
end of your post, answered that question in the affirmative in the years
immediately after Keith. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en
banc); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The interesting question is whether FISA somehow extinguishes this inherent
Presidential power to conduct foreign-intelligence surveillance. There’s a
respectable argument that it does. FISA repealed Title III’s reservation
clause (18 USC 2511(3)), in which Congress expressly had forsworn any intent
to regulate the collection of foreign intelligence. Given that repeal, we
might be in Category Three from Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence
— "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject."
Source: http://volokh.com/posts/1135029722.shtml