Greenland in the line of fire

[Celerity]

US President Donald Trump’s increasingly aggressive attention threatens Greenland’s long quest for self-determination. Now Greenlandic leaders appeal to Europe for backup.

https://feps-europe.eu/greenland-in-the-line-of-fire/





Trump Force One hit the tarmac of the newly expanded international airport in Nuuk on 7th January, bringing Don Trump Jr. as literally, the first tourist flying in directly from the US. However, painfully attentive to how Trump’s advances rhetorically oscillate between promises and threats, any excitement in Greenland soon turned to anxiety. The Monroe Doctrine says the US will not accept that other great powers establish footholds on the North American continent. And since the advent of transcontinental aviation and missile technology, the US needs to look out for nuclear attacks from Eurasia. That is why the US never left Greenland after WWII and still runs the Thule Air Base in the far Northwest – recently renamed Pituffik Space Base to honour the Greenlandic heritage of the place and to signal its transfer to Trump’s newly formed US Space Command.

Greenlanders have long aimed for independence from Denmark. Preparations have followed two parallel tracks: first, gaining independent stature and agency in international affairs in a continuous arm-wrestling with Danish constitutional law. Second, diversifying away from material dependence on Denmark for trade, subsidies and human resources. The EU has played important roles in both: Greenland’s original 1979 autonomy arrangement allowed the island to leave the European Communities as the first territory since Algeria. The arrangement felt urgent as sovereignty over fisheries – all important for the economy, employment and regional development – was about to go South. Instead, Greenland has since been associated with the EU as an Overseas Country and Territory (OCT), trading fisheries quotas for tax-free access to the single market and development aid. A representation in Brussels became Greenland’s first, serving as the training ground for the nascent Greenlandic diplomatic corps.

Even if EU subsidies – now under a partnership agreement – remain the most important contribution to Greenland’s economy after Denmark’s, Greenland has been eager to diversify revenues, exports, trade and investments further. In 2009, an upgraded autonomy arrangement was introduced. Here, a cap was put on the annual Danish subsidies – but as compensation, revenues from future mining was to stay in Greenland. As global appetite for new mining projects were low after the financial crisis, inclinations were made towards China for investment in mining and infrastructure. However, every time Chinese engagement seemed to be materialising, they each evaporated after a creative range of Danish interventions: a dilapidated naval station was taken off the market when a Chinese company put in a bid; Copenhagen stepped in with attractive financing for new airports to keep a Chinese construction company out; satellite receivers co-financed by a Chinese university were taken down; Chinese mining engineers never received their visas. In hindsight, US security concerns vis-á-vis China, communicated to Copenhagen and – increasingly – directly to the Greenlandic capital Nuuk, ultimately proved decisive.

As Greenlandic elected and diplomatic officials have been more involved directly with US counterparts, earlier pacifist stances have been dialled down to assure that even an independent Greenland will always be a member of NATO and US defence needs will be facilitated. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine occasioned the Greenlandic government to over-implement US and EU sanctions regimes – Greenlandic public and private fishing companies stopped exports and sold Russian subsidiaries – to signal its solid anchoring in the West. In parallel, Greenlandic minerals authorities engaged with both the Biden administration’s and the EU Commission’s efforts to bring about a green transition as well as further strategic independence from Chinese critical minerals. Hence, in its 2024 Foreign Policy Strategy, Greenland looked to the West, excited to further reduce their dependence on Denmark.

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